Jihadist Snapshot: Daesh & AQ Trends — Spotlight on the Death of Ayman Al-Zawahiri
The Moonshot MEA (Middle East and Africa) Snapshot Series focuses on Moonshot’s online harms and violent extremism work across the Middle East and Africa. Our analysis aims to highlight key developments and evolving narratives, and share new insights across the regions.
This spotlight focuses on Moonshot’s monitoring and analysis of the immediate response and discussion from pro-AQ and pro-Daesh supporters following the death of Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda, on July 31st 2022.
August 2022
On August 1, U.S. President Joe Biden announced that Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda (AQ) and successor to its founder, Osama bin Laden, had been killed by a U.S. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) strike in Kabul, Afghanistan. According to U.S. officials, the AQ “Emir” was killed on Sunday 31 July at 2:48 AM BST. Since 2019, two Daesh leaders have been killed in raids by the U.S. military: Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2019 and Abu Ibrahim al-Qurayshi in 2022. Al-Zawahiri joined AQ via the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) organization, which he led before the group merged with bin Laden’s AQ in 2001. Al-Zawahiri was AQ’s second-in-command during the 9/11 attacks, which he was instrumental in planning.
Senior AQ figures are now expected to decide on the group’s new leader, following al-Zawahiri’s 11 years in command, with the most speculated successor being Saif al-Adel, the alleged second in command of AQ*.
In the hours following the announcement of al-Zawahiri’s death, Moonshot monitored how AQ and Daesh supporters reacted to the news in unofficial group channels on Telegram, Hoop, and Element. We’ve summarized the main narratives identified in their discourse in the first 15 hours after posts on the leaders’ deaths first emerged, as well as forecasting the potential implications of al-Zawahiri’s killing.
This infographic summarizes the primary topics of discussion and analyzes the narratives disseminated by the two groups and their supporters in both Arabic and English.
*At the time of writing, AQ has not released any official statements commenting on the death of its leader.
How did AQ and Daesh supporters react to al-Zawahiri’s death?
AQ supporters mourn while pro-Daesh channels decry the group for moral “degeneration”
Pro-AQ channels across the monitored platforms circulated a high volume of discussion. The largest volume of posts mourned al-Zawahiri’s death and seemingly acknowledged it as fact. Notably, one post deviated from the broader acceptance of his death, claiming “he is, in fact, in good health”. AQ supporters also shared posts celebrating al-Zawahiri’s life and his commitment to AQ and its “jihad” (including 9/11), with one post shared on multiple channels claiming “he lived 71 years in obedience to God Almighty”. As well as text posts, this included audio recordings of him, lamenting poetry and anasheed (sing. “nasheed”, solely vocal songs). In posts primarily echoing the Taliban’s condemnation of the U.S. AQ supporters expressed anti-American sentiment, accusing the Biden Administration of allegedly violating international norms and Afghanistan’s sovereignty in carrying out the strike. Similar to responses frequently issued by supporters and members of Salafi-Jihadist groups following the deaths of their leaders, pro-AQ channels circulated posts that sought to project an image of the group’s continuity and success despite al-Zawahiri’s death, with one post claiming “whoever thinks the height of the peak of the [camel] hump of Islam is linked to a person is delusional”.
Pro- Daesh channels on the monitored platforms circulated a moderate volume of discussion. The majority of posts by Daesh supporters condemned al-Zawahiri, as well as AQ under his leadership more broadly — describing both as “treacherous”, “tyrannical” and “apostate”. Channels decried the fitna (sedition) that al-Zawahiri’s AQ allegedly instigated amongst the Daesh’s mujahideen (fighters), likening it to the schisms and civil wars of early Islam. They gave accounts of AQ supposedly “splitting their [jihadists’] ranks”, working with the “forces of disbelief”, targeting Daesh fighters in areas where the two groups compete for hegemony, and celebrating the deaths of its senior figures.
Besides factional rivalries, pro-Daesh supporters also emphasized the narrative that AQ had deviated from its initially “righteous” doctrinal course under Osama bin Laden, thereby “wasting [his] legacy”. One supporter claimed the group had “exchanged the rule of Islamic law for tribal and man-made rulings”, referring to AQ’s support for the Taliban.
These narratives of AQ’s moral and operational “degeneration” are in line with Daesh’s claim to be the only “legitimate and effective vanguard of global jihad”, while AQ is considered a patchwork of devolved local networks. As such, pro-Daesh supporters expressed hope that al-Zawahiri’s death will hasten the fragmentation of AQ. Even if AQ finds a successor, Daesh supporters claim that “he will have neither a word, nor obedience, nor weight”, causing AQ affiliates and fighters to fall into the arms or fall at the hands of Daesh mujahideen.
How did AQ and Daesh supporters react to the death of former Daesh leader, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi?
Daesh supporters refuse to acknowledge al-Qurashi’s death , while AQ supporters take aim at the U.S. and HTS
Overnight between February 2 and 3, 2022, the U.S. Special Forces Operations Command (SOCOM) carried out an airdrop raid targeting the residence of Daesh’s former leader Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi in Atmeh, Idlib province, Syria. According to a statement later that day by President Biden, al-Qurayshi died during the raid by detonating an improvised explosive device (IED) to evade capture, also killing members of his family. In an estimate by the Syrian Civil Defence, 13 civilians died in the incident.
Pro-AQ supporters used the event to take aim at the U.S., sharing a significant number of posts expressing anti-US sentiment in line with the group’s anti-U.S. heavy agenda. These blamed American military action for civilian deaths, seeking to deny the U.S. a victory on the basis of the number of civilians killed and the ineptitude of the operation following reports that a malfunctioning American helicopter was deliberately destroyed (by the U.S.) during the troops’ withdrawal. Given that al-Qurayshi was killed in territory held by Idlib-based jihadist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), AQ supporters circulated posts expressing anti-HTS sentiment..
Until the group confirmed its new leader, Abu Hassan al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi on March 10, Daesh issued no official statement confirming the death of Abu Ibrahim al-Qurayshi. Immediately following his death, pro-Daesh supporters did not explicitly acknowledge his killing. Pro-Daesh channels circulated updates on the operation, focusing on the civilian casualties and speculating who was the target. One post circulated an image of Abu Ibrahim, alongside a caption claiming the user did not “care about all these complicated questions [regarding the target]” and that the “only important thing” was ”dawlah [Daesh]”. Outside of the 15-hour window, narratives developed further, with an increasing number of posts expressing anti-U.S. sentiment, advising supporters not to share any information that was not confirmed by the Daesh’s official media, seeking to project the group’s continuity and criticizing HTS for allegedly allowing the raid.
The death of al-Zawahiri vs. the death of al-Qurayshi
Significant increase of pro-AQ and pro-Daesh discussions following the death of al-Zawahiri
The reaction to the death of al-Zawahiri prompted much higher volumes of discussion from both AQ and Daesh supporters. This amounted to 125% more posts in the first 15 hours of posts on the death of Ayman al-Zawahiri than that of Abu Ibrahim al-Qurayshi. In part, this was likely driven by Daesh and its supporters’ hesitancy to acknowledge their leader’s death. Additionally, the group issues official and unofficial instructions to supporters only to share content in line with its official acknowledgements, condemning supporters for circulating Western government and media lies.
In both incidents, pro-AQ audiences contributed a higher volume of posts than pro-Daesh audiences, amounting to almost twice as many posts following the AQ leader’s death and three times as many posts following the Daesh leader’s death. This may be partially due to the nature of the supporters’ networks on the monitored platforms, where Daesh supporters, even in the face of significant developments in the Salafi-Jihadist sphere, still dedicate a significant volume of discussion to promoting the group’s day-do-day operations — unlike pro-AQ channels.
What happens after al-Zawahiri’s death?
The ‘War on Terror’ saw an acceleration of the formation of AQ affiliates around the world. These affiliates pledge loyalty to the Emir and nominally obey the general strategy of al-Qaeda General Command (AQGC), yet they are able to operate with a great deal of independence. Notably, in 2005, the leader of the AQ-affiliated Islamic State of Iraq (later Daesh), Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, reportedly refused al-Zawahiri’s order to refrain from brutal sectarian attacks against Shiites. While this devolved power structure has its drawbacks when reining in rogue elements or concentrating disparate elements on a singular ambition, it also allows for continuing operational capacity in spite of deaths among leadership. It is therefore unlikely that the removal of al-Zawahiri will have a significant effect on AQ’s overall structure and stability, contrary to some Daesh supporters’ hopes and expectations.
Regarding AQ’s potential future leadership, the most significant contender at this time is Saif al-Adel, a senior commander within the group who had close links to its founder, Osama bin Laden. Whether al-Adel is announced as the new leader or if the group opts for a leader less affiliated with the group’s past, the new AQ commander will be expected to provide leadership that can galvanize and mobilize supporters for AQ and increase and sustain the group’s prominence in the face of increasing challenge from rival Salafi-Jihadist groups.
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