Jihadist Snapshot: Daesh & AQ Trends — Monthly Analysis #4

The Moonshot MEA (Middle East and Africa) Snapshot Series focuses on Moonshot’s online harms and violent extremism work across the Middle East and Africa. Our analysis aims to highlight key developments and evolving narratives, and share new insights across the regions.

This is the fourth post in a monthly sub-series of our analysis on pro-Daesh and pro-AQ online discourse.

May 2022

In May, Moonshot collected and analyzed over 600 posts across pro-Daesh and pro-al-Qaeda (AQ) channels on encrypted platforms. This infographic covers discourse propagated in May 2022. It summarizes the primary topics of discussion and analyzes the narratives disseminated by the two groups and their supporters in both Arabic and English.

Key findings

• The killing of Palestinian journalist Shireen Abu Akleh, violence in Palestine and Israel and other developments in the two countries featured heavily across both pro-Daesh and AQ channels.
• Both AQ and Daesh supporters discussed operations carried out by affiliates in Africa. Daesh supporters dedicated significant focus to the activity of Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) in Nigeria, as well as other developments in the country. AQ supporters prioritized discussion of the activities of their East Africa affiliate, al-Shabaab, in Somalia.
• Discussion surrounding the war in Ukraine has continued to decline. The conflict did not feature as one of three main narratives identified on pro-Daesh channels. On pro-AQ channels, the volume of discussion on Ukraine declined by 58% in May when compared to April.

Pro-Daesh channels

Egypt attacks

Throughout May 2022, 20% of posts from pro-Daesh channels discussed the activities of the group’s so-called “wilaya” (province) in the Sinai peninsula, Egypt. Moonshot first identified posts regarding Daesh’s operations in the Sinai on May 1 with discussion continuing until May 26. The largest volume of posts focused on a May 7 attack on an Egyptian army checkpoint at a water pumping station in the west of the peninsula, amounting to 45% of posts on the Sinai region. Daesh officially claimed responsibility for the incident on May 8, which, according to mainstream media outlets, killed one officer and 11 soldiers. The group’s supporters circulated posts celebrating the incident and criticizing the Egyptian army’s official report as inaccurate in terms of death count.

• In addition to sharing updates on developments of the attack, Daesh supporters shared the group’s official claim of responsibility and a statement by its Amaq News Agency. Daesh’s official outputs claimed that the incident was “part of the revenge for the Muslim women detained in Rafah [northwestern Sinai]”. Amid wide celebration of the incident, pro-Daesh channels shared updates from Egyptian and other Arab media outlets. Supporters also shared images of the victims, including images of an individual army officer. In the posts, Daesh supporters mocked his death and his final post on social media — claiming “next Eid will come, God willing, and the only thing your family will miss is you”.
• Daesh supporters widely criticized the Egyptian army’s statement on the attack, alleging it was inaccurate. According to the group’s official claim of responsibility and Amaq’s report, Daesh alleged it had killed 17 members of the Egyptian army and faced “no resistance”. Posts claimed that the Egyptian military statement was “lies”, stating the official death toll of 11 and claims the army had “thwarted the attack” were evidence of “false narrations”. Daesh supporters also criticized joint efforts by the Egyptian and Israeli militaries to combat the threat posed by the group in the region, claiming the “Camp David army” was “working hard to keep us away from the borders” of its “Jewish masters”.
• Daesh supporters also circulated other official claims of attacks in the country throughout the month, celebrated the group’s fighters, and offered commentary and analysis on developments. In Daesh’s official narratives, as well as those of its supporters, there was notable criticism of Sunni tribes in the Sinai peninsula who fight against the group in support of the Egyptian military — referred to by the group as “Sahawat” (a term broadly used to describe Sunni tribes who fight against Daesh globally). Daesh published an editorial in the May 12 issue of its al-Naba magazine criticizing Sunni tribes as having “betrayed” Daesh and Sunni Muslims by supporting the Egyptian and Israeli armies. This sentiment was echoed by Daesh supporters, who described supporters as “Mossadist militias”.

Israel attacks and killing of Shireen Abu Akleh

Overall, posts regarding attacks in Israel and the killing of Al Jazeera journalist Shireen Abu Akleh comprised 13% of total identified posts on pro-Daesh channels. On May 12, veteran Al Jazeera journalist Shireen Abu Akleh was shot dead in the occupied West Bank by Israeli forces while wearing a press vest and covering Israeli army raids in Jenin. According to an investigation by the United Nations Human Rights Office, the bullets which killed Abu Akleh were fired by Israeli forces, disputing Israel’s allegation that the shots may have been fired by Palestinian fighters.

• Following the killing of Shireen Abu Akleh on May 12, Daesh supporters primarily sought to discredit her for being a Christian and targeted Muslims for mourning her. Pro-Daesh channels circulated screenshots of posts mourning Abu Akleh and images of her funeral. One post depicting her funeral criticized the presence of a “Christian monk”, described as wearing the “tattered ribbon of the Palestine flag”. The post criticized the representation of the monk’s presence, that “love of Palestine” is the “exclusive” determinant of whether someone “enters Paradise”. Daesh supporters also shared posts attempting to discredit references to Abu Akleh as a martyr and claims she had gone to heaven, alleging Abu Akleh was an “infidel” and “to pray for mercy [on the dead] is exclusively for Muslims”. Another post commented on an image depicting the mourning of Abu Akleh in Mecca, claiming “the owner of paradise has decreed that no polytheist will enter it, and they [Muslims mourning Abu Akleh] say you will enter it through the gates of Palestine only!”.

The majority of other posts linked to Israel discussed an attack on May 5 in Elad, Israel, where two attackers killed three individuals in an axe and knife attack, amid increasing tensions between Palestine and Israel.

• Posts discussing the Elad attack broadly celebrated the incident as an attack on Jews, but did not present it as a victory for the group. Instead, some posts sought to use the opportunity to highlight previous Daesh victories in Israel, drawing attention to allegedly Daesh-linked attacks in Beersheba and Hadera on March 22 and 27. Pro-Daesh channels shared posts depicting the aftermath of the attack and, in keeping with responses to previous attacks, mocked the responses of Israeli security and emergency services. Additionally, Daesh supporters also shared images of the victims, before and after their deaths, celebrating their killings.
• A small number of posts from Daesh supporters discussed further violence in Israel and Palestine, including attacks by Israeli security forces on the al-Aqsa Mosque compound and the annual May 29 Flag March in Jerusalem. The latter is an annual event when Israeli nationalists march through the Muslim Quarter of Jerusalem in celebration of Jerusalem Day. Jerusalem Day, not intentionally recognized, marks the annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967, and often leads to violence. One post was identified discussing the event, calling for attacks against Jewish civilians and claiming “you will not find what hurts them [Israel] more than what they call civilians”. Posts regarding attacks at al-Aqsa criticized the actions of Israeli security forces, with one referring to them as “brothers of apes and pigs, killers of prophets”.

Daesh-claimed attacks in Nigeria and protests in the country

Posts discussing Daesh’s attacks, operations and civilian protests in Nigeria amounted to 8% of discussion identified on pro-Daesh channels in May 2022.

• 65% of posts on Nigeria discussed Daesh’s attacks and its operational development in the country. Primarily, Daesh supporters circulated a series of posts comprising claims of responsibility, as well as releases from the group’s Amaq News Agency. These included a video depicting Daesh fighters executing Christians and images showing the targeting of a Nigerian army base with mortars. Daesh supporters celebrated the attacks, with one post claiming “the nation’s swords are brandishing their knives in obedience to God”. Following Daesh’s alleged expansion in Nigeria, which began in April, Daesh supporters continued circulating posts commenting on the developments. One included a map of the group’s current, newly “expanded” and prospective areas of operation, celebrating Nigeria’s and Africa’s “strategic location and nature”. Supporters also commented on individual incidents in relation to the alleged expansion. One post, in response to an improvised explosive divide (IED) attack of unconfirmed origin, questioned “are we facing a new extension of ISWAP’s activity?”.
• On May 12, a group of Muslim students in Sokoto, Nigeria, reportedly stoned a female Christian student to death for allegedly making blasphemous remarks regarding Prophet Muhammad. Following the detention of two individuals in connection with her killing, protests calling for their release reportedly erupted in the city. Daesh supporters circulated posts discussing and celebrating the developments, including footage of demonstrations, and implicitly supporting the protestors. A small volume of posts supported the protests and, criticized Muslim Nigerian authorities for allegedly condemning the killing. One post, shared across multiple platforms, compared Nigerian Muslims and Arab Muslims, implying the former were “better” and claiming their Arab counterparts had “lost” the “glory of Islam”. Another post criticized Arab Muslims in comparison to African Muslims, claiming “in the Arab countries, no one moves a finger” in response to “insults, cursing and mockery of our religion and our Messenger’’. The post also claimed that Daesh’s “aqidah [creed]” managed to “penetrate the hearts” of “these Africans”, alleging that “if the world mobilizes its humans and demons, it would not find a way against them”.

Pro al-Qaeda channels

Developments and violence in Palestine and Israel

Overall, posts discussing developments and violence in Palestine and Israel comprised 26% of the total number of posts on pro-AQ channels in May. Primarily, AQ supporters discussed the Elad attack, the killing of Shireen Abu Aklehon May 12 and the Flag March in Jerusalem on May 29, amounting to 84% of discussion on Palestine and Israel.

• Pro-AQ channels circulated posts celebrating and providing updates on the May 5 attack in Elad, though a smaller volume of posts compared to Daesh supporters. AQ supporters celebrated the killing of Israeli Jews. One post shared an image of a victim, claiming “feels like the cleaver 🪓🪓 was right for him 🤔” and using another weapon would be a waste of a “rocket or a gunshot”. Another post celebrated that the “bloodshed was no longer limited to Palestinian”, claiming the violence was “blood for blood” and “demolition for demolition”. One post also sought to criticize unspecified Palestinian armed groups, implying they did nothing against Israel and likening them to “rabbits”.
• Pro-AQ channels circulated a higher volume of posts on the death of Shireen Abu Akleh, when compared to pro-Daesh channels. AQ supporters reactions’ ranged from mourning Abu Akleh and criticizing the mourning of her death due to her Christianity. One post mourning Abu Akleh claiming she was “one of the most important factors in exposing the systematic crimes of the occupation”, while another claimed “she watered the trees of Palestine with her blood and revived the cause of al-Aqsa with her spirit”. Contrastingly, other posts criticized the mourning of Abu Akleh and the global response to her death. One such post claimed that, despite Abu Akleh’s killing being a “heinous crime”, the killings of Muslims were not discussed “as if they were not people”. It questioned “is it because they are not Christians or not journalists?”. Similarly to Daesh supporters, other posts condemned the use of the term “martyr” to describe Abu Akleh, claiming “the use of the term martyr is specific to the Islamic religion”.
• Pro-AQ channels circulated a large number of posts discussing the Flag March in Jerusalem. These posts sought to document attacks by Israeli nationalists participating in the event against Palestinians in the Muslim Quarter of occupied East Jerusalem and offered updates on the march’s progress. One post highlighted those involved as “extremists”. AQ supporters also sought to offer “analytical” predictions on developments during and following the march.
• A small number of posts discussed Israel’s attacks on the al-Aqsa Mosque compound and attacks on the Jenin refugee camp, in the occupied West Bank. AQ supporters shared videos depicting violence by Israeli security forces actions at al-Aqsa, claiming “they destroy al-Aqsa Mosque and attack the worshippers”. Other posts included a video and an update on violence at the Jenin refugee camp, referring to it as a “real battle in Jenin”.

Al-Shabaab attacks in Somalia

20% of posts from pro-AQ channels in May 2022 discussed the operations of the group’s affiliate in Somalia, al-Shabaab. These posts primarily discussed a May 3 attack against an African Union camp near Ceel Baraf, Hirshabelle, which, according to mainstream news outlets, killed 10 Burundian soldiers, injured a further 25, and resulted in five being declared as missing. Posts regarding the Ceel Baraf attack amounted to 86% of all posts on discussing al-Shabaab’s operations.

• Pro-AQ channels circulated a series of posts celebrating the Ceel Baraf attack against the “Burundian infidels” and sharing the group’s claim of responsibility. Several video and image posts depicted the aftermath of the incident, including imagery of killed soldiers. Additionally, posts sought to celebrate al-Shabaab’s perceived generosity claiming “al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen gave permission to the people of Ceel Baraf to loot the equipment in the Burundian camp”. Other posts claimed that the group had called “on the public to pursue and disarm the Burundian army in the area”. AQ supporters also shared a number of Somali-language recordings and an interview with a resident discussing the attack.
• AQ supporters circulated news and updates of other alleged al-Shabaab attacks in Somalia during May 2022, providing death toll updates and celebrating the “mujahideen forces”.

Ukraine

Posts discussing Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine represented 13% of posts by pro-AQ supporters in May 2022, down from 31% in April 2022.

• Posts regarding the Ukraine primarily provided updates and “analysis” and documented losses for both the Russian and Ukrainian militaries. Pro-AQ channels circulated a series of posts providing neutral updates on developments in the Ukraine, including posts sharing and summarizing articles by mainstream news outlets. A small number of these posts were dedicated to neutral discussion of Finland and Sweden’s NATO bid. Posts providing analysis speculated on the outcome of the war, with one such post claiming “it will never end until Putin leaves power (death or otherwise)”. AQ supporters also shared posts outlining material losses for the Ukrainian and Russian armies, documenting damaged or destroyed military equipment with imagery.
• Notably, a small number of posts also carried an analysis of weapons utilized by Ukraine in the conflict. Two of the posts seemingly praised Ukrainian military tactics in using weapons, with one post depicting an image of an allegedly improvised vehicle, claiming it was a “local car” which was “made by volunteers” and suggesting that the “forces of the [Syrian] revolution can benefit from this idea”.