Jihadist Snapshot: Daesh & AQ Trends — Monthly Analysis #3

The Moonshot MEA (Middle East and Africa) Snapshot Series focuses on Moonshot’s online harms and violent extremism work across the Middle East and Africa. Our analysis aims to highlight key developments and evolving narratives, and share new insights across the regions.

This is the third post in a monthly sub-series of our analysis on pro-Daesh and pro-AQ online discourse.

April 2022

Moonshot collected and analyzed over 800 posts across pro-Daesh and pro-al-Qaeda (AQ) channels on encrypted platforms. This infographic covers discourses propagated in April 2022. It summarizes the primary topics of discussion and analyzes the narratives disseminated by the two groups and their supporters in Arabic and English.

Key findings

• For the first time since February 2022, discussion of developments in Ukraine was not one of the three dominant themes on pro-Daesh channels, while still featuring prominently within pro-AQ channels.
• Attacks witnessed in Israel in April were a more popular theme on pro-AQ channels than on pro-Daesh channels, whereas the reverse was true for attacks in Israel in March. It was the most popular theme of discussion within pro-AQ channels, accounting for 40% of their total output in April, compared to 5% in March. In pro-Daesh channels, this was the second-most discussed theme with approximately 11% of their output detailing the incidents, compared to 15% in March.
• AQ channels discussed the performance of Ukraine’s Turkish-provided Bayraktar drones against Russian forces and the need for factions in Syria to manufacture their own drones to “terrorise” the enemy.

Pro-Daesh channels

Daesh’s audio release and the “Battle of Revenge for the Two Sheikhs”

On April 17, Daesh’s al-Furqan media outlet released a speech, titled “Fight Them, Allah Will Punish Them by Your Hand”. Around 20% of posts identified on pro-Daesh channels discussed the release and the subsequent commencement of the “Battle of Revenge for the Two Sheikhs”. The speech, made by Daesh’s spokesman Abu Omar al-Muhajir, announced the battle as a revenge campaign for the killing of the group’s former leader, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi, and spokesman, Abu Hamza al-Qurayshi.

• Moonshot identified posts discussing the speech shortly prior to its release. Posts celebrated the upcoming release and called for Daesh supporters to prepare for media jihad (dissemination of Daesh content online) to circulate the release. Pro-Daesh channels also warned the group’s supporters to be aware of potentially malicious links claiming to provide access to the speech. Another post alleged that global “intelligence services” were also waiting and “shaking in fear”, in anticipation of the speech.
• Daesh supporters circulated a series of posts celebrating the release of the speech, in text and image format. These posts also celebrated the supposed fear that the speech would inspire in Daesh’s enemies, with one post summarizing responses by rival groups, “enemy” nations and global media outlets as proof of this fear.
• Between April 17–27,¹ pro-Daesh channels circulated a series of download links, transcripts, excerpts and clips of the speech, as well as posts summarizing its key points. In the immediate aftermath of the release (April 17–18 ), transcripts were shared in Arabic. However, on April 22, a pro-Daesh media network circulated a full English-language translation of this speech.
• Daesh supporters circulated posts discussing the “Battle of Revenge for Two Sheikhs” between April 19–26. Posts primarily celebrated the attacks that Daesh fighters had allegedly carried out across its self-proclaimed provinces and offered analysis of developments. According to a post circulated on multiple platforms, the battle allegedly proved the “strength of the group’s [Daesh] cells and detachments” and “the stability of Muslim [Daesh] leadership”.
• Throughout the two week period of the “Battle of Revenge for the Two Sheikhs”, Daesh’s self-reported data indicated a significant increase of approximately 117% in the number of operations claimed by the group, when compared to the week prior to the speech’s release and “battle” commencement. The data also indicated that the highest volume of operations were carried out in the group’s self-proclaimed provinces in West Africa, Iraq, and Syria.

Attacks in Israel

Following on from attacks in March 2022, violence in Israel and Palestine continued throughout April 2022.

• On April 7, a Palestinian gunman, named Raad Hazem, attacked a bar in Tel Aviv. According to mainstream media outlets, three Israelis were killed in the incident and Hazem was killed in a subsequent manhunt. Following the attack, international leaders sent their condolences to Israel and condemned the attack.
• Between April 15–29, 2022, tension heightened in occupied East Jerusalem after Israeli security forces attacked the al-Aqsa Mosque compound and Palestinian worshippers. Ensuing protests and violence injured 180 Palestinians according to the UN, and three members of the Israeli security forces according to Israeli media.
• Additionally, the Israeli Air Force and Hamas exchanged fire in the Gaza Strip between April 19–21.

Approximately 11% of all pro-Daesh posts discussed ongoing violence in Israel and Palestine.

• The highest volume of posts discussed the April 7 attack. Pro-Daesh channels celebrated the attack, in addition to circulating clips and images of the attack and its aftermath. The updates that circulated included reports from Israeli media outlets and state authorities. Celebratory posts referred to the attack as a “victory” for God and shared images of the attacker. Additionally, Daesh supporters mocked first responders and Israeli security authorities. Posts regarding the manhunt mocked its alleged “inadequacy” and implied it was evidence of “fear”. One post compared it to Daesh’s January 20 attack on the Ghwayran prison in Syria, likening Hazem to Daesh fighters.
• Though Daesh supporters widely celebrated the April 7 attack, most posts stopped short of referring to Hazem as a “martyr”, with one post advising against using the term because “we do not [yet] know… his orientation, intention or creed”, meaning his allegiance to Daesh, his aims and ideology. As Hazem’s affiliation was unknown, he had supposedly not met the “conditions” for being called a “martyr” by Daesh.
• Following the attack, members of the international community sent their condolences to Israel and condemned the attack. Daesh supporters circulated posts condemning the reactions of countries, political figures and armed groups in reference to the April 7 attack. Posts criticized the Turkish and Emirati embassies’ condemnation of the incident. Another post, criticizing a condemnation by the President of Palestine, Mahmoud Abbas, mockingly stated “the first donkey has spoken”. Another post criticized Hamas for allegedly not retaliating against Israel, claiming “while a lone wolf entangles himself with the Jewish army” Hamas was “holding a military parade in Gaza”.
• A minority of posts discussed the attacks on the al-Aqsa Mosque, all condemning Israeli security forces. Daesh supporters circulated posts both explicitly and implicitly calling for operations by the group in response to the incidents. One post claimed “supporters should take part in the duty of inciting the targeting and killing of the Jews”. Another post depicted an individual waving a Daesh flag at the mosque, seemingly in an implicit attempt to encourage further activity by the group’s supporters.

Attacks in Afghanistan

On April 21, Daesh claimed responsibility for an improvised explosive device (IED) attack targeting a Shia mosque in Mazar-e-Sharif, claiming it killed or injured over 100 worshippers. On the same day, Daesh also claimed responsibility for an attack targeting a Kunduz airport transport bus, claiming that 20 airport employees were killed or injured. These claims came amid significant activity by Daesh’s fighters in Afghanistan, and fell within the timeframe of the “Battle of Revenge for the Two Sheikhs”. Between April 19–28, pro-Daesh channels on the monitored platforms circulated posts discussing the group’s operations in the country. 10% of posts discussed Daesh attacks in Afghanistan.

• The majority of posts from Daesh supporters relating to Afghanistan focused on the April 21 attacks in Mazar-e-Sharif and Kunduz. In addition to sharing updates and casualty tolls, Daesh supporters widely celebrated the incidents, circulating images of the aftermaths of each attack and praising the killing of “Rawafidh” (derogatory term for Shia Muslims). Daesh supporters also celebrated the attacks in the context of the “Battle of Revenge for the Two Sheikhs”, with one post celebrating Daesh’s presence in Afghanistan for “entering the #battle with force”. Pro-Daesh channels detailed developments in Afghanistan, sharing updates and claims of responsibility regularly between April 19–28.
• Pro-Daesh channels circulated a minority of posts claiming to provide analysis of developments in Afghanistan, which featured anti-Taliban sentiment. Several posts claimed to assess Daesh’s own activity in the country, with one post circulating a map allegedly showing an increased presence of the group near the Chinese border and claiming that the “Taliban cannot protect its own rear end”. Other posts assessed developments among the Taliban, including discussion of alleged Taliban redeployments to the Iranian border. One such post claimed it was impossible for both sides to “open the door to war”, claiming that the Taliban “had enough [going on] with the soldiers of the caliphate”.

Pro al-Qaeda channels

Attacks in Israel

Approximately 40% of all pro-AQ posts discussed ongoing violence in Israel and Palestine, with the majority focusing on the al-Aqsa Mosque compound attacks.

• In response to the April 7 attack, AQ supporters circulated praise and celebratory posts, with one post describing it as a “heroic operation”. In contrast to pro-Daesh channels’ reaction to the attack, multiple pro-AQ channels referred to Hazem as a “martyr”. Following the attack, AQ supporters posted images and video clips of the incident and its aftermath, including the subsequent manhunt, and provided regular updates on the number of casualties via mainstream media reports. Some channels mocked the victims, with one post declaring that “Jews will not rest in a usurped land”. Supporters also considered the wider “tactical implications” of recent “commando operations inside Israel”, with one post claiming that conducting such attacks from within Israel, rather than crossing into it from the West Bank, “helps” avoid capture by the Palestinian Authority, which has security coordination agreements with Israel.
• Following the attack, international leaders sent their condolences to Israel and condemned the attack. Pro-AQ audiences responded negatively to these messages, particularly that of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. One pro-AQ channel described Turkey’s diplomatic stance towards Israel and Palestine as “deceptive” for allegedly referring to the “heroic jihad” as “terrorism”. President Erdoğan’s statement comes in the context of a recent “thaw” in Turkey-Israel relations, which had been effectively broken since 2010. Over that time, Turkey allegedly provided logistical and diplomatic support to Hamas (who also rebuked Turkey for its statement).
• On April 15, pro-AQ channels condemned the Israeli security forces for attacking the al-Aqsa Mosque compound and those within it, with one post describing it as a “desecration”. Supporters shared updates of the situation in image, video, and text format. Pro-AQ audiences also circulated celebratory posts in response to the supposed “victory” of the Muslim worshipers protesting the attack as Israeli forces eventually withdrew, with one post calling it “majestic”.
• One post considered the raid on the al-Aqsa Mosque compound an attack on the “entire Ummah [Islamic nation]”. Due to the alleged “silence” of Muslim leaders on the incident, one pro-AQ channel considered it an unprecedented “historical shame”, while another saw it as “proof” that said leaders are “infidels” who want Palestinians “completely annihilated”. Calls for Palestinians to take up violent action were circulated on the platforms.
• When Hamas and Israeli forces exchanged fire on April 19, AQ supporters shared a limited number of posts discussing the exchange. Most of these were updates and news reports about the situation. A small number of posts praised Hamas, with one celebrating its role in “liberating the Ummah ”, as well as Gaza more broadly, whose “glory and heroism […] bears the heavy trust of the Ummah”.

Developments in Ukraine

In April, pro-AQ supporters continued to discuss developments in the conflict in Ukraine. This theme comprised 31% of the total outputs of pro-AQ channels, with more than half consisting of neutral updates from mainstream media reporting or reposts of think tank analyses. The remaining outputs expressed anti-Russian sentiment, accused the West of “double standards”, drew inspiration for military tactics, and gave predictions of the war’s course and their wider implications. The volume of discussion peaked on April 12, with audiences discussing emerging evidence of war crimes in Bucha, Germany’s subsequent decision to pledge arms to Ukraine, and Russia moving military equipment to the border with Finland.

• Pro-AQ audiences discussed developments in Ukraine by detailing casualty numbers of both sides’ forces; examining arms transfers to Ukraine and Ukrainian forces’ usage of them; sharing footage of attacks and destroyed vehicles; and considering the “points of weakness and strength” in either side’s strategies and capabilities. One channel paid particular attention to Bayraktar drones, provided by Turkey to Ukraine. One post claimed that these drones are “strategic weapons” that have “changed the course of wars”, urging armed factions in Syria to “make every effort to manufacture [them]… and terrorise the enemy”.
• Several AQ channels assessed that Russia is “losing the war”, with one claiming “It is clear that, with Allah’s help, Russia will be annihilated”, in response to news of a significant US arms transfer to Ukraine. Another claimed that Russia’s recent military activities in Syria, Libya, and Ukraine have “revealed the weakness of the Russian army… relying on brutality alone”. One post circulated amongst Pro-AQ audiences predicted that Russia will lash out to “restore its prestige” after its supposed “setbacks”. On April 12, Russia allegedly moved military equipment, including missiles, to the border with Finland, after Finland and Sweden commenced discussions to join NATO. In response, a pro-AQ channel expressed hope for this “show of strength” to backfire and for Russia to be “embroiled” and “immolated” in a new war.
• AQ channels held varied perspectives on the wider significance of Russia’s progress in the war, or the war more broadly. One AQ supporter celebrated Russian losses as a sign of divine intervention, claiming that “the [Russian] planes that bombed you [in Syria] are falling!!” in “vengeance for the martyrs”. Another pro-AQ channel, however, mocked Western leaders’ “shouting” about the “dreaded Putin!”. The post claims that Western leaders are “more cursed than [Putin]”, alleging that they are “criminals” and “hypocrites” for “starving the entire people of Afghanistan to keep their money in their banks”.

Emergence of evidence of the 2013 Tadamon Massacre

In April 2022, the Guardian released evidence of a 2013 massacre in the Damascus neighborhood of Tadamon. Video footage shows Branch 227 of the Assad regime’s military intelligence division executing 41 blindfolded civilians and subsequently covering up the war crime. The investigation, almost exactly nine years after the massacre, led to the identification of a number of the perpetrators and victims. Approximately 10% of all posts on pro-AQ channels in April discussed the evidence of the massacre coming to light.

• AQ supporters shared the investigation as well as the original, 40-minute footage of the massacre. Audiences reacted with condemnation for the perpetrators and their alleged facilitators, with one post describing the perpetrators as “small monster[s]” led by a “big monster” in the “forest of the beasts of the Baath [Party]”, referring to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Posts expressed anti-Alawite (the religion of the Assad family) sentiment, calling the massacre a “crime of the Nusairis [a derogatory term for Alawites]”, with several supporters demanding revenge against “the tyrant of al-Sham [Syria], his army and his sect”.
• Some AQ supporters took the massacre as “vindication” of the cause of the Syrian uprising in 2011 and the armed conflict against the regime that ensued. While one pro-AQ channel called for “accountability” in the international courts, another claimed that there can only be “retribution” through the “continuation of jihad” and the “sparking of [a new] revolution”. A post circulated also described the Tadamon massacre as one of many thousands of massacres [1that Muslims have experienced since the “tragedy” of the fall of the Ottoman Caliphate. The post claimed that to end the “cycle”, Muslims must “bring down the regime” and work to “restore the Islamic state”.

¹ Moonshot’s analysis of posts referencing the “Battle of Revenge for the Two Sheikhs” only includes posts referring to the overall battle, which were published in the immediate 48-hour period surrounding the speech’s release. Posts discussing attacks carried out in the name of the battle were analyzed on a regional basis.